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INTRODUCTION 
International expansion of Russian multinational enterprises (MNEs) has significantly 
increased since the early 2000, but this theme has interested a small number of scholars. Despite 
the fact that today not a few research papers and articles are dedicated to the theme of multinational 
enterprises in emerging economies, only a small part of them are focused on international 
enterprises in Russia. The interest of scientists of MNEs could be explained by the growth of 
importance emerging market multinationals. Multinational companies from India, China, Brazil 
and Russia use different internationalization strategies, entry and consolidation models that help 
them to become the leading players on the foreign markets. 
The internationalization of companies from emerging economies is fairly new phenomenon 
and rapid development of multinational companies for several decades has been leading to a new 
wave of business studies that try to answer the interesting question: how can companies that do 
not have strong brand names and rarely own a lot of resources and technological capabilities 
compete with large multinational companies from developed countries? 
It is not correct to utilize the same criteria for analysis of multinationals from emerging 
economies and MNEs from developed countries because of the following reasons. Firstly, MNEs 
from developing countries typically do not have strong resources and unique technological and 
other capabilities that ultimately make them the market leaders. Secondly, emerging multinationals 
since their foundation were forced to operate in under-developed environment which is 
characterized by high level of government ownership, instability and feeble market mechanisms. 
Therefore, multinational companies from emerging countries in most cases depend on domestic 
state that takes part in the strategy formation and also controls their activities within the country 
and abroad. These factors lead to the situation when MNEs need to competently build relations 
with the state that is able to provide the compensation for companies’ weaknesses (Wang, 2012). 
This master thesis is devoted to the topic of forms and directions of government 
involvement in internationalization process of Russian MNEs. In the context of Russian 
institutional environment this topic is very important because the role of Russian government in 
business is extremely high, especially in the case of MNEs that represent the strategic interest for 
the state in international arena. Thus, it is important to understand the relationship between 
government and the largest Russian companies in order to understand the pattern and peculiarities 
of their internationalization process.  
 
Research gap and topicality 
This study is important because it covers the topic of internationalization process of 
Russian multinationals and the role of the domestic state in this process. The work is focused on 
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the research of Russian multinational companies for some reasons. The first one is that Russia was 
included into the list of 20 largest home economies in the world (UNCTAD report, 2015). 
Secondly, Russia is one of the most prominent representative of the countries with emerging 
economy that today play a vital role in the development of world economy. Finally, today Russian 
economy is one of the less studied and examined in worlds business literature: for this reason, the 
research of the theme of Russian MNEs will significantly increase the existing poll of knowledge.  
 
Research problem 
Research problem can be identified as «How does Russian state influence the 
internationalization process of domestic firms and which mechanisms does it use during 
interaction with them». Previous research studies do not consider internationalization and 
institutional theory together: this study covers this gap by analyzing the role of government and 
political connections in internationalization process of Russian firms.  
In addition, most of research papers that focused on role of political connections in 
internationalization process usually are too general and do not pay attention to level or degree of 
political connections in the companies and do not account for differences between companies that 
have different levels of political connections. This study approaches this gap by dividing political 
connections into several levels and analyzing how each of them impacts internationalization.  
The master thesis is based on deductive approach. The first step in the research was the 
analysis of previous empirical research dedicated to the topic of forms and directions of 
government involvement in internationalization of domestic firms. Theoretical articles and other 
foundations consider different aspects of research problem. The statement of hypotheses was 
included into literature review because each hypothesis is supported by the theory and explained 
circumstantially. Acceptance or rejection of hypotheses helped to consider research problem, 
achieve the research goals and objectives and answer on research questions that are formulated in 
the second chapter. 
 
Structure of the paper 
The remainder of the following research is divided into four sections. The first section is 
dedicated to the review of the literature relating to internationalization of Russian MNEs, 
indicators of internationalization, direct and indirect mechanisms of government influence on 
domestic firms, role of political connections in internationalization process of companies. The 
second part includes description of research design and methodology, main goals of the master 
thesis and research questions. The third part consists of the explanation about conducted research 
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and description of the results of the analysis. The forth part consists of summary and discussions 
and suggestions for further studies and finally, practical managerial recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 1. RUSSIAN MNES AND THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL 
INFLUENCE ON THEIR INTERNATIONALIZATION 
1.1 Theoretical context of the research 
 
Defining multinational companies 
Despite the fact that globalization for a long time was driven by multinational companies 
from countries with developed economies, multinationals from emerging countries have recently 
begun to operate in new markets typically through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). 
According to the definition of Dowling, Liesch, Gray and Hill (2009, p.123), MNE is «any 
business that has productive activities in two or more countries». In other words, multinational 
firms are companies that have shown their ability to operate and play role in the global scene. 
Proof of the international status can be found in such types of characteristics as the considerable 
scope of companies’ operations, big-league profits, the employment of large multinational 
workforce, globalized customers in international market (Panibratov, 2012a). 
Russian MNEs 
Russian multinational enterprises (MNEs) are well-known leaders in their home market, 
but only a few of them has been accepted onto the world stage as equal partners. However, it is 
explainable: the internalization of Russian companies became possible only in 1991, the period of 
appearance and development of private business in the post-communist period (Panibratov, 
2012b).  Therefore, most of Russian multinational firms are quite young, not highly experienced 
and weaker according to some indicators than their foreign counterparts. Nevertheless, today 
Russian companies have a lot of opportunities to achieve recognition in the international arena. A 
lot of MNEs now have sufficient funding in order to make some significant foreign investments 
and show their ambition and competitiveness in international market. 
There is no consensus on the exact number of Russian MNEs. Their number directly 
depends on the approach and methodology. According to Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations, there are 20 top Russian multinational firms relied on their foreign assets 
(2013). Panibratov (2012a) considers 160-170 Russian MNEs that consist of the companies with 
the largest revenue operating in the Russian market and abroad without companies which are 
foreign subsidiaries or companies with more than 50% of foreign ownership, companies which 
had not begun the internationalization process yet and companies which did not disclose any 
information to public on their foreign activities. Deloitte (2008) supposes that there are 
approximately 5,000 Russian multinational firms. In general, non-transparency and concealment 
of information promote the lack of reliable data about this topic. 
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Emerging Russian multinational companies vary from state-owned giants to privately 
owned conglomerates keeping former government assets and newly established companies with 
shareholders from foreign countries. But it would be incorrect to divide Russian multinationals 
only into private and state-owned. For instance, private companies simultaneously consist of 
dynamically developing business groups and «rent-seeking empires of the oligarchs» (Kuznetsov, 
2011, p.67 ). As for state-controlled enterprises, they include both market-oriented companies and 
ineffective firms that can not exist without government support.  
Internationalization 
Despite the fact that internationalization is a widely used term in academic literature 
researches have not yet create a universal definition of this process. There are different approaches 
that consider internationalization process from different perspectives. According to classical 
definition, internationalization is the process when the companies gradually increase their 
international involvement (Johanson, Vahlne, 1977). Another internationalization concept 
considers internationalization as the process through which the companies raise their awareness of 
the impact of international operations on their future and «establish and conduct transactions with 
companies from other countries» (Beamish, 1997, p.36). The main forms of internationalization 
process are exports, foreign direct investment (FDI) and international contacts (Conconi, Sapir, 
Zanardi, 2010). This study is based on the classic definition given by Johanson and Valhne. 
Another fundamental question of international business literature is what determines the 
internationalization and how it should be measured (Dörrenbacher, 2000). Internationalization 
may be analyzed and measured by three categories of internationalization that include structural, 
performance and attitudinal (Dörrenbacher, 2000; Sullivan, 1994).  
Structural indicators provide the representation about international expansion of the firm 
at a given time (Dörrenbacher, 2000). This type of indicators includes the following parameters 
(Gomes, Ramaswamy, 1999; Dörrenbacher, 2000): 
• Number of countries where the company affiliates; 
• Ratio of foreign assets to total assets; 
• Proportion of foreign affiliates; 
• Proportion of foreign assets; 
• Number of cases of non-capital involvement abroad; 
• Proportion of sourcing abroad; 
• Number of foreign employees/ ratio of foreign employees to total employees; 
•  Amount of shares owned by foreigners; 
•  Number of stock markets on which a company listed. 
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The second group is performance indicators that show how well the firm operates in the 
foreign markets. These indicators consist of 5 main parameters (four of them represent foreign 
sales, the last one - operating income abroad): 
• Amount of foreign sales by customer location; 
• Amount of sales of foreign affiliates and revenues of foreign affiliates; 
• Exports from home country; 
• Sum of revenues of foreign affiliates; 
• Sum of operating income of foreign affiliates. 
As for attitudinal indicators, they provide reflect on the relationship between the domestic 
country of the company that internationalizes and its foreign operations (Curwen, Whalley, 2006). 
This type of indicators includes (Dörrenbacher, 2000): 
• Ethno, poly, region and geocentric management styles in accordance with 
authority, decision making process, organizational complexity, communication 
flows, recruiting, control, staffing. 
• International experience of top officials of the company that measured by counting 
number of the years that top managers spent working in foreign countries weighted 
by the total years of their work experience. 
Jankowska (2001) distinguished measures of the company internationalization based on 
different features of internationalization such as exports of products; international contacts; foreign 
direct investment; employment; deliveries of materials, fixed assets and services; companies with 
ownership share of foreign capital; foreign sources of financing operational activity; foreign 
portfolio investment. Measures of internationalization are summarized in the Table 1. 
Table 1. Measures of internationalization process 
 
Feature of internationalization 
 
 
Indicator of internationalization 
 
 
 
Exports of products 
- Share of revenue from export sales in total 
volume of revenues 
- Share of profit from exports in total volume 
of profits 
- Share of foreign clients in total number of 
company clients 
 
International contacts 
- Share of sales revenues from sales through 
foreign partners in total volume of revenues 
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- Share of profit from sales through foreign 
partners in total volume of profits 
- Share of foreign clients attracted through 
foreign partners in total number of company 
clients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign direct investment 
- Number of production process links located 
in other countries in relation to total number 
of links in the company value chain 
- Value of assets (fixed capital and current 
assets) constituting foreign direct investment 
in the total value of company assets (fixed 
capital and current assets) 
- Number of branches located abroad in 
relation to the total number of company 
branches 
- Share of revenue from sales of products 
manufactured in factories being foreign direct 
investment in total volume of revenues 
- Share of profit earned on sales of products 
manufactured in factories being foreign direct 
investment in total volume of profits 
 
 
 
 
 
Deliveries of materials, fixed assets and 
services 
- Share of deliveries of raw materials, parts 
and components by foreign suppliers in total 
amount and value of deliveries 
- Share of machines and equipment bought 
from foreign companies in total value of 
machine and equipment purchases 
- Value of purchased services of foreign 
subcontractors in relation to total value of 
purchased services 
 
Companies with ownership share of 
foreign capital 
Share of foreign start-up capital in total value 
of company start-up capital 
Share of foreign start-up capital in total value 
of capital  
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Foreign sources of financing operational 
activity 
Share of foreign capital (loan, leasing, 
subsidy) used to finance operational activity in 
total sum of company capital  
 
 
Employment 
- Ratio of people employed abroad to total 
number of employed people 
- Number of employees with foreign 
citizenship in relation to total number of 
employees 
Source: summarized by author based on Jankowska (2001) 
 
 
1.2 Role of the state in internationalization process of MNEs 
Domestic governments play a crucial role in internalization of multinational companies 
from emerging countries (Michailova, Panibratov, 2012). They have actively involved in OFDI 
and encouraged it through often expensive and quite controversial public policy and economic 
regulations (Johnson, Mitton, 2003). Governmental policies in emerging countries that aim to 
foster OFDI can be considered as development strategy because in the perspective these policies 
can lead to economic growth (Knoerich, 2012; Caseiro, Masiero, 2014). Therefore, the more 
international activity of the domestic companies sets the goal to secure scarce assets for the home 
economy, the more is its potential to facilitate to national development and for this reason it should 
be supported through public policies (Caseiro, Masiero, 2014). In addition, the strategy of global 
promotion of domestic companies can be used in order to prevent foreign multinationals from 
taking full control over home industries and sectors at the same time as raising connections with 
global flows of resources, capabilities and technologies are generated (Knoerich, 2012). 
There are a lot of questions about ideal relationship between government and domestic 
companies. According to Evans (1995, p. 124), «long-term successful industrial policy is usually 
implemented within an embedded autonomy-type of relationship between state and companies» It 
means that the government should build close links with domestic firms and be aware of their main 
challenges and capabilities. At the same time government should be autonomous and avoid 
situations when it can be captured by firms’ short-term interests, formulated and implemented 
policies that fulfill the needs of national development through a consistent set of institutions and 
instruments (Caseiro, Masiero, 2014). 
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Resource-based, industry-based and institutional concepts 
There are three different views on internationalization process of companies from countries 
with emerging economies – resource-based, industry-based and institutional concepts.  
Resource-based theory that is based on the idea that distinctive features of MNEs 
international expansion can be explained by the differences between companies’ special resources 
and capabilities. This concept considers internationalization as the process when the company 
wants to use its competitive advantages (resources, technological capabilities, strong brand name) 
in international markets or try to get new resources and assets (Buckley, Clegg, Kafouros, 2012).  
In recent academic literature government support and political connectedness of the 
companies is considered as a really influential managerial resource especially in the countries with 
emerging level of economy (Li, He, Lan, Yiu, 2011). It happens because formal institutional 
framework is not fully formed in countries with developing economies and in this situation 
government and political connections are more important in contributing economic exchange (Fan, 
Huang, Morck, Yeung, 2009). In these countries in many cases the state has strategically important 
resources and allocates them, takes part in approving different projects and intervenes in business 
operations. For this reason, politicians within the company can provide insider important 
information about government motives and plans and the receipt of strategically important 
resources and administrative affirmations (Peng, Lee, Wang, 2005). The government often has the 
impact on companies through people that belong to companies’ board members or top 
management and perform as government informants (Peng, Lee, Wang, 2005). 
The government in emerging countries often creates the rigorous administrative procedures 
of OFDI approval and strictly controls domestic companies' international activities and at the same 
time tries to support them through subsidizing OFDI by firm in strategic industries and negotiating 
state contracts and auspicious conditions for OFDI in host countries (Child, Rodrigues, 2005). In 
this political context politicians within the company and political connections can help the 
company to receive licenses, financing, resources and technologies that are essential in entering 
the international market (Guillen, 2000).  
Thus, political connections can be considered as a powerful competitive advantage of the 
company especially when the company wants to enter new markets or develop its 
internationalization process. The company’s ability to enter new markets directly depends on the 
assess to necessary resources and assets. As was mentioned before, markets in emerging 
economies are not well developed and therefore, the state intervention in the activities of the 
company can be estimated as significant advantage. The government can support domestic MNEs 
by providing access to strategically important resources, better public provision and ensuring 
insider hidden information.  Therefore, the following hypothesis was stated: 
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Hypothesis 1. Number of former and present politicians among top officials of the company 
positively influences the internationalization. 
Not a single one organization can be considered alone, without institutional context (Scott, 
2008).  Therefore, in the case of internationalization of MNEs from developing countries rather 
than merely considering their international expansion as the result of distinctions in position of 
resources and capabilities, it would be appropriate to view their internationalization as a result of 
their relationship with government agencies.   
As for institutional theory, it states that internationalization as a part of firm strategy is 
driven not only by special company’s resources but also largely by different «isomorphic pressures 
and the need to meet environmental demands» (Hong, Wang, Kafouros, 2015, p.50). Multinational 
companies perform in fragmented institutional context and force to face complex institutional 
pressures (Saka-Helmhout, Deeg, Greenwood, 2016). Institutions play a vital role in operation of 
MNEs from emerging economies that «experience political and institutional reforms and 
institutional voids» (Dunning, Lundan, Cantwell, 2010, p. 570).  
There is no doubt that the role of the government in internationalization process of 
multinational companies is extremely important both for firms from developed and emerging 
countries. Nevertheless, the government is much more influential in countries with developing 
economies. This fact can be explained by the following reasons. The first reason is that the state 
in developed countries rarely directly intervenes in the internal operations of the company and 
controls the activities in the international markets. In the emerging countries we can the opposite 
situation: local government not only actively involved in the company's operations, in many cases 
the state owns a lot of MNEs (Hong, Wang, Kafouros, 2015).  
The influence of the government on internationalization process of MNEs can be seen both 
as advantage and disadvantage (Panibratov, 2012a). On one hand, the state can act as a market 
regulator and support national firms through special tax rebates, foreign exchange and financial 
assistance. Furthermore, the state can create international agreements in order to defend OFDI. 
Nevertheless, one should accept that government in a lot of cases puts pressure on national 
companies and limits their international expansion. 
The state also impacts on internationalization process by means of direct ownership in 
companies. For instance, when the government is the main shareholder of the company, it can 
determine what strategy should the firm choose and how should it perform in international market. 
In this situation the risk that the firm will receive not economically beneficial solutions but those 
that accommodate political goals becomes high. Managers of state-owned enterprises often 
internationalize in order to enhance geopolitical standing (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, Boateng, 2012). 
From these facts, one may conclude that the state has an impact on the ability of multinational 
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companies to operate in foreign markets (Hong, Wang, Kafouros, 2015). Moreover, previous 
empirical researches proved that the government gives much more support for state-owned 
enterprises rather than private companies (Fan, Huang, Morck, Yeung, 2009). Therefore, it is 
logical to create the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2. Government ownership positively influences internationalization. 
The third concept is industry-based theory that states that companies’ activities and 
performance are largely determined by the industry in which the company operates. Structure of 
the industry, its characteristics and competition within each industry influence the probability of 
gaining the success on international market.  
Regarding to internationalization, industry concept considers that internationalization 
process of the companies directly depends on the competition inside the industry in which it 
operates (Hyrner, 1976; Botter, Holmquist, 1996). Sometimes a lot of competitors in the domestic 
market encourage the companies to go abroad. According to Delios and Beamish (2001) the firm 
is more likely to start internationalization process if its industry is characterized by high 
concentration.  
Another important point related to internationalization and industry-based concept is the 
idea that different industries have different potential for globalization (Yip, 1992). Klevorick, 
Levin, Nelson and Winter (1995) argue that companies that produce standardized products have 
more chances to be successful in international market than firms that produce consumer products 
and highly impacted by differences in preferences.  
The previous studies have shown that the companies that represent strategic sectors of 
economy (oil and gas, electricity, military and mining industries) are most state-controlled. Some 
industries such as education, media and sport sphere are not strictly controlled by the government 
but are of strategic interest to the state.  
 
1.3 Mechanisms of government influence on MNEs 
The state usually affects the internationalization of domestic firm in the following 
directions (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, Wright, 2012): 
• companies’ strategic goals and decisions; 
• the availability and cost of different resources and capabilities; 
• the ways how these resources and capabilties are used; 
• the procuring of important knowledge, information and valuable services; 
• transaction costs connected with transborder expansion. 
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The government influences national multinational companies using formal and informal 
mechanisms (Bazuchi, Zacharias, 2013). Formal mechanisms are visible actions that government 
use to control multinational companies through the executive, legislative and judiciary branches 
while informal mechanisms are invisible actions mediated by personal networks and informal 
institutions that penetrate the public sphere.  Developing countries and economies are also 
characterized by direct and indirect involvement of the state in the domestic companies’ 
operations. The state usually uses ownership rights, mechanisms of control and regulations (Peng, 
2000).  
Emerging economy governments can offer direct support providing OFDI promotion 
policies that include such tools as trade shows and inter-government agreements in order to directly 
assist and regulate exports and OFDI (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, Peng, 2013). Moreover, 
emerging governments provide direct support in internationalization ensuring a low cost of capital 
for domestic MNEs (Buckley, 2010) or indirect support through «negotiation of bilateral treaties 
with host country governments to protect OFDI» (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, Peng, 2013, p. 
1301). 
The type of mechanisms that the state uses influencing internationalization of MNEs 
directly depends on two factors: the degree of state ownership in a given company and the level at 
which company is affiliated to the state (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, Wright, 2012). The degree of 
state ownership related to the government's share in the ownership of the company and the number 
of officials in the board of directors or supervisory board.  The second one refers to situations 
when the state impacts international expansion of domestic firms by establishing links with the 
companies (Wank, 1995). The institutional inclusion of the firm also depends on hierarchical rank 
of the government that affects their actions (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, Wright, 2012). 
 
The role of state ownership and governmental affiliation level 
These two dimensions differ greatly and influence decision-making process of MNEs 
differently. When the government is the owner or shareholder of the company, it uses direct 
mechanisms of influence MNEs but the influence the state affiliation on companies is indirect, it 
usually happens through networks.  
The framework that explains how government ownership in the company and state 
affiliation level affect companies was created by Wang, Hong, Kafouros and Wright (Figure 1) 
(2012). The main idea of the matrix is to show that when the degree of the government ownership 
in the company is high (Cells 2 and 4) the state directly influences companies’ international 
operations by assigning executives and creating regulations related to government-owned assets. 
In this situation the firms need to balance political aims and desires of the state and market demand 
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and chose the strategy consistent with government policy. It is also critical to mention that 
managers that work in the companies with high degree of government’s share chose 
internationalization strategy in accordance with the position of the official structures because 
career growth depends on whether they succeed in implementation state’s objectives (Ramamurti, 
2001). In other words, decision about the internationalization of state-owned enterprises or 
companies with high level of state’s ownership are driven by political goals. Nevertheless, such 
type of companies often receives governmental contracts that in many cases contribute their 
internationalization (Ramamurti, 2001). Thus, the following hypothesis was created. 
H3. Government contracts positively influence internationalization. 
Speaking about government affiliation, it is important to mention that it can be at a high 
(state/provincial) or low (city/country) levels. When the companies deal with high level (Cells 3 
and 4), they receive more support from the governmental official structures during their 
internationalization. State’s affiliation mirrors greater status that enhances the trust of a focal 
company and decreases the uncertainty that their prospective international partners may feel about 
the company (Jensen, 2003). Moreover, in comparison with low level of affiliation (Cells 1 and 2) 
where the main goal of local government is to increase local economy output and revenue (Liu, 
Sun, Woo, 2006), government at high level set up more strategic goals, it is more concerned with 
integration of the country into world economy and therefore encouraging companies to invest 
overseas is one of their main priorities (Child, Rodrigues, 2005). 
In addition, state government in many cases reallocates surplus labor and other assets 
towards new initiatives; one of this strategic initiatives can be international expansion (Wang, 
Hong, Kafouros, Wright, 2012). State government provides domestic companies special resources 
that related to foreign markets while local government usually has limited resources and 
capabilities in most situations related only to local markets (Sun, Mellahi, Thun, 2010). 
Figure 1. Matrix of state ownership and government affiliation level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 4 
1 3 
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Source: Wang, Hong, Kafouros, Wright, 2012 
In general, emerging economy governments are often criticized for inadequate property 
rights and ineffective laws (Sun, Peng, Lee, Tan, 2015). In the context of internationalization of 
MNEs legal system and its enforceability are extremely important because they contribute 
transactions and resolve conflicts and help companies to expand their business abroad (Zhou, 
Peng, 2010). 
 
1.4 Political connectedness 
Measurement of political connectedness 
Political connectedness relates to the situation when the officials of the companies are 
former or present politicians or have personal contracts with the state and government structures. 
According to Faccio (2006), the firm can be called politically connected or related to the 
government if at least one of its members of board of directors or top management belongs to the 
following groups: parliament member, politician, deputy, minister, governor, major. In this 
research similar classification was used. 
It is also important to mention that a lot of researches pay attention to both former and 
present experience in politics because people from governmental institutions usually save 
important contacts and can use them during the whole career. In the research conducted by Fan, 
Wong and Zhang (2007) the company has political connections if its general director is the present 
or former official of the central or local government and military structure. This research is based 
on China institutional environment where militaries are close related to the government. Boubakri, 
Cosset and Saffar (2012) also take into consideration both former and present politicians and prove 
the same argument that officials with political past can retain their connections and receive some 
bonuses from them after resign. 
Based on the previous researches the criteria for classification of firms according to their 
political connectedness were created. The company can be called politically connected in the 
following cases: 
• Members of board of directors are present or former politicians. 
• Top management of the company includes present or former politicians. 
• Members of board of directors have personal connections with government. 
• Top management of the company has personal connections with present or former 
President, prime minister or other politicians. 
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In addition to former or present politicians among companies’ officials, the level of 
political affiliation can be measured through amount of government contracts, level of state 
ownership in the company. 
 
The role of political connectedness  
The researches do not reach the consensus about the effect of political connections on the 
companies. Most of the empirical studies related to this topic prove the idea that political 
connections are a really powerful competitive advantage that can bring the company a lot of 
bonuses such as access to strategically important resources, economically beneficial government 
contracts, access to insider secret information. The overview of role of political connections on 
the companies is represented in the Table 2. 
Table 2. Positive and negative effect of political connections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Role of political 
connectedness  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive effect 
 
 
Negative effect 
Access to strategically 
important resources 
(Goldman,  Rocholl, So, 
2009; Boubakri,  Cosset, 
Saffar, 2012) 
Government intervention 
and an intention to satisfy 
the social service’s 
objectives (Fan, 2007; 
Faccio, 2010) 
Low taxes (Faccio, 2010) State-owned enterprises 
often internationalize in 
order to enhance 
geopolitical standing 
(Wang, 2012) 
Access to credits (Khwaja, 
Mian, 2005; Leuz, 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; 
Claessens, Feijen, Laeven, 
2008; Boubakri, 2012) 
Political objectives are 
more important than 
strategic economic goals 
(Hong, Wang, Kafouros, 
2015) 
Benefits during the IPO 
(Francis, Hasan, Sun, 
2009) 
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 Lobbying regulatory 
policies adopted in the 
state (Agrawal, Knoeber, 
2001) 
 
Government bailout 
(Faccio, 2006) 
 
Government contracts 
(Goldman, 2009) 
 
Access to insider hidden 
information (Wang, 2012) 
 
Source: developed by author 
The table shows that from one hand, political connections can be considered as a 
company’s resource that can become strong competitive advantage. On the other hand, political 
connections and government intervention can be harmful for company’s economic prosperity 
because political purposes become more important than economic goals. 
Most of the studies examined correlation between political connections and different 
company’s indicators are focused on countries with developing economies. It can be explained by 
the fact that the role of the state is more important in countries with emerging economy rather than 
in developed countries. Internationalization process of MNEs from developed countries is market-
driven while internationalization of MNEs from developing countries largely depends on 
institutions and home government. 
One should note here that economic, institutional and market development, state structure 
of various countries with emerging economies may differ significantly. Thus, the role of the 
government can be more visible and important in one countries with developing economies than 
in others. For instance, some scholars ague that large countries with emerging economies such as 
China, Russia, India are characterized by a high level of state involvement in their operations 
(Hong, Wang, Kafourous, 2015). 
 
1.5 Political connections and internationalization 
In developing markets unstable political and economic structure significantly increases 
uncertainty and unpredictability of business operations that may create some difficulties for 
companies’ operations and international expansion. In this situation one of the solution can be 
establishment of network connections (Önder, Simga-Mugan, 2006; Heath, Peng, 1996). If the 
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company is not able to build partner relationship with domestic government the chances of failure 
of this company in international arena will significantly increase (Hong, Wang, Kafourous, 2015). 
In contrast, companies that interact with local state closely often receive a lot of bonuses 
that can be classified as firms’ intangible assets (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, Wrighy, 2000). Previous 
researches can come to conclusions about advantages that can bring cooperation with government. 
For instance, Faccio (2006) concluded that companies with political connections receive more 
credits and loans and more assistance from the state during period of adversity. Another researches 
Wu, Chongfeng, Zhou, Wu (2012) found that firms with connections with the government in many 
cases acquire favorable tax rate and high level of market share.  
These facts lead to dissemination of idea that the crucial element of company’s success in 
countries with emerging economy is the ability to shape and maintain connections with the state 
by appointing managers and board members with political connections or background (Peng, Luo, 
2000; Khanna, Palepu, Sinha, 2005). 
Speaking about internationalization strategy it is essential to mention that companies 
usually use two ways of international expansion – export and foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
choice of the strategy requires the compromise between high variable trade costs related to export 
strategy and high fixed set-up costs related to FDI (Conconi, Sapir, Zanardi, 2010). In general, the 
choice of internationalization strategy is extremely difficult because internationalization usually is 
accompanied by a high level of uncertainty about performance and operations in foreign markets. 
Majority of the researchers believes that companies in order to receive market-specific knowledge 
should begin their internationalization through export or in some situations switching to regional 
subsidiary sales (Johanson, Vahlne, 1997; Conconi, Sapir, Zanardi, 2010).  
However, the company internationalization strategy can be changed significantly if the 
government supports it through access to credits, special contracts with foreign governments, 
reduction in tariffs or taxes, providing government contracts (Goldman, 2009; Faccio, 2010; 
Boubakri, 2012; Wang, 2012).  In the case of state support the company can begin its 
internationalization with establishing foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, it is reasonable to propose 
the following hypothesis: 
H4: High level of political connectedness is positively related to foreign direct investments. 
As was mentioned above, political connections can bring a lot of bonuses for the companies 
in terms of their operations, performance, access to strategically important resources and other. 
After detection of these factors, the researchers decided to go further and identify how political 
connectedness can impact on internationalization process. The first researchers that found the 
correlation between internationalization and political connections or government support were 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001). They found that the more former or present politicians among 
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member of board of directors, the more international activity company has. Moreover, they noticed 
that high amount of board members with political experience significantly increases the size of 
sales to the state and lobbying activities. 
Other researchers Wang, Hong, Kafouros and Boateng (2012) identified that government 
support is positively related to FDI. The researcher focused on China market and examined 667 
Chinese companies; state ownership was chosen as independent variable and amount of FDI 
represented dependent variable. 
The results of both studies showed that government involvement correlates with 
internationalization performance of the companies. The more amount of political connections of 
official of the company and the more government support, the more the company internationalized. 
Thus, it is logical to propose the following hypothesis: 
H5: High level of political connectedness of board members and CEOs positively influences 
internationalization. 
 
1.6 Russian institutional context 
The relationship between multinational companies and Russian government has attracted 
much attention from scholars. The firms in strategic industries such as oil and gas are responsible 
for a large part of OFDI; for this reason, a lot of researchers argued that international expansion 
and activities of Russian companies should not be explain only by the economic motives. Some 
scholars noticed that companies in strategic sectors of Russian economy may be operating in 
foreign countries to serve the interest of Russian state and its foreign policy (Vahtra, Liuhto, 2004; 
Vahtra, 2005). Government controls companies from strategic important industries and supports 
them making these firms «national champions». Through laws, regulations and institutions, state 
impacts on multinational companies and in some cases dominates transactions within an economy.  
Consequently, the role of Russian government should be taken into consideration in the questions 
related to internationalization of Russian MNEs. 
Evaluation of government influence on internationalization process 
Government influence on MNEs operations and internationalization process can be 
evaluated using two categories: control (the stake of the government in the company’s ownership) 
and interest (the number and quality of incentives provided to the companies) (Panibratov, 2013). 
The previous studies have shown that the companies that represent strategic sectors of Russian 
economy (oil and gas, electricity, military and mining industries) are most state-controlled. For 
their regulation the government tries to retain at least partial control in the private firms in such 
industries as oil, gas, transportation, telecommunications, mining, steel (Boubakri, Cosset, Saffar, 
2012). 
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Some industries such as education, media and sport spheres are not strictly controlled by 
the government but are of strategic interest to the state. Banking, metallurgy and telecom industries 
have a big impact on state's image; therefore, the government is interested in their development. 
For the last few years Russian government is also highly interested in development in IT market 
and support internationalization of other industries such as education and scientific research 
(Panibratov, 2015).  In addition, Russian state set the goal to greatly increase the share of IT 
industries in the Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) (RF Government, 2012). 
These examples prove the suggestion that there are essential institutional variations across 
different sectors of Russian economy. OFDI is fostered and subsidized in some sectors (oil, gas, 
electricity, military), but other industries (fast food, automotive, logistics) are not a priority for the 
state. It can be explained by the fact that heavy sector is the largest contributor to the government’s 
budget and at the same time the most significant token of the state’s productive power (Panibratov, 
2012b). These variations are significant source of competitive advantages and different 
internationalization results of MNEs (Hong, Wang, Kafouros, 2015).  
Influence on internationalization of state-owned and privatized companies 
State-owned companies receive support from the government such as access to resources, 
capabilities and important information, loans and credits from the central bank, administrative 
support that facilitate their international expansion (Panibratov, Kalotay, 2009). At the same time 
state influence remains in private companies or firms with partial government share. 
The major amount of Russian export and foreign direct investments (FDI) are made by 
group of natural resources. «Raw materials account for two thirds of Russian exports and Russian 
energy and metal companies have a strong leverage in many of their target markets» (Vahtra, 
Liuhto, 2005). The leading companies in gas, oil and metal sectors are the subject of national 
interest of Russian government and because of it these companies are often influential bearers of 
political power abroad.  In other words, the role of the state in international performance of Russian 
firms can be described as industry-driven and the extent of the control and involvement of the 
government differs across sectors of Russian economy (Panibratov, 2012). For instance, in gas, 
atomic and oil industries, multinational companies receive essential financial and administrative 
support from the state. For those industries that do not represent the national interest for the state, 
the government provide support and control through administrative mechanisms.  
While excessive control and dependency can be regarded as a disadvantages that limit 
companies’ activities, it provides MNEs financial and political security and the access to resources 
that gives the companies opportunity to perform and compete in foreign markets (Jormanainen, 
Koveshnikov, 2012; Panibratov, Latukha, 2014) and develop the economy in home country. This 
is extremely important for Russian companies because they are the most morbidly feeling the 
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effects of the crisis compared with firms from other developing countries such as Brasil, India and 
China (Andreff, 2015). During the global economic crisis in 2008 Russian OFDI stock was the 
most unstable and decreased by 20% and in 2011 17% down but during the recovery in 2010, it 
showed the highest rate of growth (74%) in comparison with other BRICS countries (UNCTAD, 
2014). 
Barriers 
Another direction considering the state's influence on international expansion of domestic 
firms is the negative role of the government in internationalization process (Globerman, Shapiro, 
2009; Lewin, Witt, 2007). Among them are bureaucratic regulations, corruption and heavy 
taxation on domestic earnings (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, Peng, 2013). In addition, a lot of 
managers in Russia are really concerned about political and economic instability which may lead 
to expropriation of assets (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, Peng, 2013). In general, political 
instability and weak institutional development became the reason why a lot of Russian companies 
turns their activities at home into subsidiaries of foreign companies that registered in other 
countries such as Cyprus, British Virgin Islands, Mauritius. 
Russian economy needs a structural reform and enhancement of competitiveness in order 
to transform Russia from the country with natural-resource economy to innovation-oriented 
country (Vahtra, Liuhto, 2006). Nowadays the lack of transparency and corruption do not allow 
Russia to achieve its full potential. Russia’s problem and challenges can be traced to its incapacity 
to create sustainable formal institutions that will overcome its institutional voids (Puffer, 
McCarthy, Jaeger, 2016). 
Overall, the literature review helps to understand the topic in detail and provide material 
that helps to build the hypotheses based on the results of previous empirical studies. All hypotheses 
are presented in the Table 3.  
In general, literature review provides important information about measurement of 
internationalization and political connections, direct and indirect mechanisms of government 
influence on domestic firms and their internationalization process, existent theories that consider 
internationalization process from different perspectives – resource-, institution- and industry-
based concepts.  
Literature review also includes overview of different views on the role of government from 
emerging markets on domestic firms. This generalization was very important for the deep 
understanding of the topic and development of hypotheses. Overview of previous empirical studies 
helps to choose appropriate statistical method for the further analysis and understand that variables 
should be chosen for the consideration. 
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Table 3. Developed hypotheses 
Hypotheses Literature 
Hypothesis 1. Number of former and present 
politicians among top officials of the 
company positively influences the 
internationalization. 
Guillen, 2000; Child, Rodrigues, 2005;  
Peng, Lee, Wang, 2005; Fan, Huang, Morck, 
Yeung, 2009; Li, He, Lan, Yiu, 2011. 
Hypothesis 2. Government ownership 
positively influences internationalization. 
Fan, Huang, Morck, Yeung, 2009;  Wang, 
2012; Hong, Wang, Kafouros, 2015. 
Hypothesis 3. Government contracts 
positively influence internationalization. 
Ramamurti, 2001; Wang, Hong, Kafouros and 
Wright, 2012. 
Hypothesis 4. High level of political 
connectedness is positively related to foreign 
direct investments. 
Goldman, 2009; Faccio, 2010; Boubakri, 
2012; Wang, 2012. 
Hypothesis 5. High level of political 
connectedness of board members and CEOs 
positively influences internationalization. 
Agrawal, Knoeber, 2001; Wang, Hong, 
Kafouros and Boateng, 2012. 
Source: author 
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CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Research objectives 
The aim of the study is to develop the understanding of the government role in 
internationalization process of Russian multinational enterprises. This study has three main 
objectives: 
1) to investigate empirically the role of home government in internationalization process 
of Russian MNEs.  
2) to evaluate the extent of government influences on internationalization process of 
Russian MNEs.  
3) to find relationship between political connections of top officials (board members and 
top management) and internationalization strategy of Russian MNEs.  
 
2.2 Research questions  
The study aims to answer on the following questions:  
• What demarcates the involvement of the government in the internationalization 
process of Russian MNEs? 
• How the internationalization process of Russian MNEs depends on the type of the 
government impact? 
• What is the effect of political connections on internalization process of Russian 
MNEs? 
• How the strength of political connection influences international strategy (form of 
expansion and geographical presence) of Russian firms? 
Answers on these questions can help to overview the topic in detail and achieve the main 
goal of this research. Theoretical aspects of the issues were considered in the first chapter, in the 
second part practical aspects of the problem will be discussed. 
 
2.3 Research method 
This research consists of several scientific methods that help to investigate the problem 
deeply and achieve the main goal of the research. Generally, this work is a quantitative study that 
based on the secondary data from databases, Russian and international journals and corporate 
websites. The current study follows the positivism concept that involves the hypotheses creation 
that should then be systematically tested. This approach was chosen because it allows to conduct 
the objective research through precise control and measurement.  
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In order to investigate the correlation between government role and political connections 
of top officials and internationalization process of Russian firms the explanatory type of research 
was used. This type of the research helps to explain why something is happened and forecast 
similar phenomenon in the future. 
The main model that was used in this study is regression analysis because this method 
allows to statistically estimate relationships between variables. 
 
2.4 Data collection process 
The empirical setting of the current work is Russian largest companies. The sampling of 
Russian multinational companies for the current research was obtained from the annual ranking 
Expert 400 that consists of the largest Russian companies in terms of sales and revenues. Purely 
domestic companies, Russian subsidiaries of foreign multinationals and companies where foreign 
ownership exceeds 50 percent were excluded in order to make sample more homogeneous. The 
main purpose of this work is to assess the influence of government and political connections of 
CEOs and board of directors on internationalization process of Russian MNEs, therefore 
companies which have not started their internationalization were also excluded. As a result, the 
final sample includes 157 firms.  
The study was conducted with usage of secondary data that was collected through such 
sources as Spark and Skrin databases, Interfax Center for the disclosure of information, 
companies’ official websites, annual reports, Russian and international newspapers, magazines 
and other media (New York Times, Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Financial Times, 
Kommersant, Lenta, Ria Novosti). The databases were used in order to receive information about 
age, industry where companies operate, members of board of directors and CEOs, financial 
indicators. Most of corporate websites include firms’ annual reports and biography of CEOs and 
board members that were also important for this study. Interfax Center includes information about 
companies’ annual financial indicators. As for Russian and international media, these sources 
provide information about political connections of board members and some biographical facts 
that for different reasons do non mention on the corporate websites. 
 
2.5 Regression model and variables 
One of the objectives of this research is to explain the correlation between government 
influence/ political connectedness on internationalization process of Russian largest firms. 
Therefore, the main method of this study is regression analysis that helps to predict one variable 
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from other variables. The study consists of three types of variables: control, dependent and 
independent variables (Table 4). Further, each variable will be discussed in more detail. 
 
Control variables: firm size, board size, total sales, intangible assets, industry, ROA 
Following previous researches (Lemmon, Lins, 2003), we decided to control some risk 
factors that might impact on the objectivity of the research. The first control variable is firm size 
that measured by the logarithm of total sales. Firm size was chosen as control variable because 
larger companies may be better positioned to access resources in the international markets and 
have more opportunities (financial and others) in their internationalization.   The second risk-
control variable is board size that also might have affect on companies’ s financial indicators and 
internationalization process (Hermalin, Weisbach, 2003; Dalton, Dalton, 2005; Vo, Phan, 2013). 
The last one is total sales that measures the total revenue of the company in 2014. 
Another control variable is administrative expenses that show how Russian companies use 
operation expenses; intangible assets that represent non-physical long-term resources of an entity 
and ROA that shows how profitable a firm is relative to its total assets. These indicators represent 
the effectiveness of the company at a certain level of government influence (ROA), the expenses 
that include costs on board of directors and CEOs (administrative expenses), intangible value of 
the company, which is also formed by top officials of the company (intangible assets). 
The last control variable is the industry where the company operates. As was mentioned in 
theoretical part, in many cases type of the industry determines company’s performance. The final 
sample consists of 12 industries to which companies from the sample belong. 
 
Dependent variables: FSTS, foreign countries, characteristic of foreign countries, 
FDI, international activity 
The second group is dependent variables that include the international degree. In the first 
chapter several indicators of internationalization were discussed. In this study such criteria as ratio 
of foreign sales total sale (FSTS) was used in order to measure companies’ internationalization. In 
order to answer on the question about the influence of political connections of top officials on 
geographical choice of the number of countries where the firm operates was used as dependent 
variable. In addition, FDI was chosen as a dependent variable that shows which 
internationalization strategy the company uses. 
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Independent variables: government ownership, politicians on the board of directors 
and among CEOs, level of political connections, government contracts 
The third group is independent variables that show the level of political connections in 
Russian companies. The first independent variable is the percentage of government ownership in 
the company. There are different views on the impact of government impact researcher. Some of 
them ague that high percent of government ownership is detrimental to company value (Borisova, 
Fotak, Holland, Megginson, 2012) while other believe that government ownership can help the 
companies to handle with external difficulties and uncertainties (Agrawal, Knoeber, 2001; 
Hillman, Withers, Collins, 2009). The previous research papers measure government ownership 
by calculating total percentage of shares that directly owned by the state or government companies 
(Luo, Yao, 2006). The same measurement was used in this research. 
The second independent variable is the number of politicians that now work in different 
governmental structures. Members of the board and CEOs that are politically connected should 
held such posts as minister, deputy minister, governor, major. The data that helped to access the 
political connectedness was found on the companies’ corporate websites, Russian and 
international journals and magazines. 
The third independent variable is the degree of political connections. Based on previous 
researches we decided to use four scoring system in order to assess the rank of these connections. 
The highest level of political connection is attributed to those who have held top positions in the 
central government (Du, 2011). In this case we gave 3 points those who have close connections 
with former and present Presidents and prime-ministers of Russian Federation. The close ties 
include friends, classmates and colleagues that can be considered as members of the team of 
president or prime-minister – for example, advisors (Fisman, 2001). If the person has present 
connections on the federal or high regional (exmp., governors) levels, the variable equals to 2. In 
the situation when the person has political connections on the federal or regional level in the past 
or political connections on municipal level (majors) it equals to 1 point. In the case when political 
connections were not found, the variable equals to 0 points. 
The last one is amount of governmental contracts and revenue that the companies received 
form them. This variable helps to assess the level of government interest in the company, state’s 
support and financial results that the companies receive from it. Access to state contracts, that 
measured by the total sum of contracts awarded by a company during the study period, is taken as 
indicative of close relationships to politicians. 
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Table 4. Variables 
Control variables  Dependent variables Independent variables 
1) Firm size (logarithm of 
total sales). 
 
2) Board size (total amount 
of board members)  
 
3) Firm age (age of the 
company) 
 
3) Total sales (total revenue 
of the company) 
 
3) Intangible assets 
(intangible value of the 
company) 
 
4) Administrative expenses 
(total amount on costs on 
operations) 
 
5) Return on assets 
(expressed as a percentage) 
 
6) Firm industry (industry 
where the company operates) 
 
 
1) FSTS (the ratio of foreign 
sales to total sales) 
 
2) Foreign countries 
(number of countries where 
the firm operates) 
 
3) Characteristics of foreign 
countries (CIS, Europe, Asia, 
Pacific Region, Offshore) 
 
4) FDI  
(the amount of foreign direct 
investment during one year) 
 
 
1) Government ownership 
(dummy variable; does state 
has the shares in the company 
or not) 
 
2) Politicians on the board 
of directors and among top 
management (number of 
present politicians in board of 
directors and top 
management team) 
3) Level of political 
connections (3 points – top 
positions on the central 
government; 2 points - 
federal or high regional 
levels; 1 point - federal or 
regional level in the past or 
political connections on 
municipal level; 0 points – no 
political connections) 
 
4) Government contracts 
(dummy variable; 1 was 
given to the company which 
revenue from government 
contracts exceeds 1 percent of 
the total sales) 
Source:author 
 
Models 
With the help of regression model it will be possible to identify which factors have the 
most influence on internationalization process. As for the models that were used in this study it 
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consists of different kind of analysis that perform different goals. T-test helps to evaluate the 
differences in the means of FSTS and number of counties where firm operates in order to test 
whether there exists any difference between the means of these two variables with independent 
variables assembled in two groups based on their corresponding level of government involvement. 
The following regression models were created: 
FSTS = β0+β1*FS + β2*Industry+ β3*TS + β4*Int. A. + β5*Adm. Ex.+ β6*ROA+ β7*GO 
β8*GO + β9*POBDT + β10*PC + β11*GC + e 
Foreign Count. = β0+β1*FS + β2*Industry+ β3*TS + β4*Int. A. + β5*Adm. Ex.+ β6*ROA+ 
β7*GO β8*GO + β9*POBDT + β10*PC + β11*GC + e 
FDI = β0+β1*FS + β2*Industry+ β3*TS + β4*Int. A. + β5*Adm. Ex.+ β6*ROA+ β7*GO 
β8*GO + β9*POBDT + β10*PC + β11*GC + e 
Models above are created for each dependent variable, such as foreign sales to total sales, 
number of foreign countries and ratio of exports to FDI. Each model includes all control variables, 
which are firm size, board size, firm age, total sales, intangible assets, administrative expenses, 
return on assets and firm industry. 
2.6 Limitations  
There are some limitations of this research, among them are: 
1) lack of transparency of Russian companies – some information about political 
connectedness of companies may be non-public and carefully hiding (Liuhto, Vahtra, 
2005); 
2) difficulties in generalization of information and full usage of results and 
recommendation for the companies from other countries because the research considers 
only Russian companies and Russian institutional context; 
3) the sample list includes 157 Russian MNEs, however, sample consists of not all of the 
representatives of this type of company. 
 
  
 36 
CHAPTER 3. FINDIGNS AND ANALYSIS 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
As can be observed from the Figure 2, the majority of the companies have affiliates in 
between 1 and 5 countries. In general, the data is normally distributed with a long right tail. It is 
also important to mention that the most popular destinations for the internationalization of Russian 
companies are Europe and CIS countries that can be explained by close geographical location and 
similar culture. In turn, less popular destinations for international activities of Russian companies 
have become Pacific region that also quite logical: the countries from this part are located far from 
Russia and its culture differs significantly that can create difficulties in conducting business.  
A considerable number of Russian companies also operates in offshore countries such as 
Cyprus, Luxemburg, British Virgin Islands. The most common area for offshore is Cyprus that 
has extremely low taxes, similar culture and convenient geographical position for Russian 
companies. However, according to consulting agencies, Cyprus will soon lose its urgency because 
the head of state of Russia and the Republic of Cyprus signed an agreement according to which 
the registration of legal persons in Cyprus becomes possible only if the entity has the Cypriot 
founders and (or) operates in Cyprus, but not in Russia (PwC, 2014). 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of quantity of foreign countries where Russian companies have 
affiliates 
 
                            Source: developed by author 
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Descriptive statistics showed that average number of members of board of directors in 
Russian companies equals 7,5 that means that the amount of board members varies from 7 to 8 
people (Figure 3). The number of former and present politicians among members of board of 
directors and top management varies from 0 to 11 persons with the mean of 2,23. It means that on 
average, the companies has 2 current or former politicians among its officials. Regarding to the 
level of political connections, it has a mean of 1,31. Therefore, it can be concluded that on average, 
the level of political connections in the companies varies between 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of the amount of members of board of directors 
 
                    Source: developed by author 
 
Statistics also depicts that the number of politicians among board of directors and top 
management connects with the level of political connectedness. A large number of politicians 
among board of directors and top management usually accompanied by the existence of the 
connections on the presidential level. As for the level of political connections, statistics shows that 
the most common levels of political connectedness for Russian companies is federal, regional and 
municipal levels; connections on the presidential level are not very common for Russian 
companies. Forty companies among 157 do not have political connections at all. 
The study also has two dummy variables – government ownership (does Russian state 
shares in the company) and government contracts (does revenue received from government 
contracts exceeds 1 percent of the company’s total sales). Regarding to these variables, descriptive 
statistics shows 28 percent of the companies has the government as a shareholder. As for the 
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overnment contracts, it was shown that only 15 percent of the companies receive these contracts 
from the government and get revenue from them. However, it is important to mention that there is 
no single database containing information on all government contracts and the companies that 
have received then in a given year. Information about state contracts was collected from different 
sources, therefore, probably some data was missing. 
The overview of average numbers regarding to political connectedness is represented on 
the Table 5. 
Table 5. Average numbers of political connectedness 
Indicators of political connections Number 
Politicians on the board of directors and 
among top management 
2,23 
The level of political connections 1,31 
Government ownership 28% of the companies has the state as a 
shareholder 
Government contracts 15% of the companies receive state contracts 
Source: developed by author 
 
 In general, the total amount of observations for all variables was 157 with the exception 
of dependent variable FSTS (101 observations) that can be explained by inaccessibility of 
information or even intentionally hidden facts about export and revenue from activities in 
international market. Overall, the results of descriptive statistics for all variables are presented on 
the Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Observations 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Control variables   
Firm size 157 17 2,27 10,2 25,8 
Board size 157 7,52 1,00 4 18 
Total sales 157  139330566805 324345,8 328000 4299680200000,00 
Intangible 
assets 
157  
78245999722 
 
2346,7 
 
90000 
 
46807000000 
Administrative 
expenses 
157  
6004793169 
 
1365,5 
 
536000 
 
81900769000 
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Return on 
assets 
 
157 
 
2 
 
 
2,89 
 
-23,76 
 
35,4 
                                         Dependent variables   
FSTS 101 39,77 40,00 0,1 98 
Number of 
foreign 
countries 
157     
CIS 101 2,35 2,8 1 22 
Europe 73 1,32 2,5 1 3 
Asia 36 1,09 3,0 1 2 
Pacific 3 1 1,4 1 1 
Offshore 44 1,268 1,8 1 4 
                                            Independent variables   
Government 
ownership 
157 17,75 35,50 0,00 100 
Number of 
politicians 
among 
members of 
board of 
directors and 
top 
management 
157 2,23 2,89 0 11 
Level of 
political 
connections 
157 1,28 1,81 0 3 
Government 
contracts 
157 3,04 13,5 0 119 
 Source: developed by author 
 
In order to generalize information Russian companies were distributed in accordance with 
industries to which they belong. As well as a lot previous studies (Doerrenbacher, 2000; Conconi, 
Sapir, Zanardi, 2010), the descriptive statistics shows that the most internationalized companies in 
Russia in terms of ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FSTS) are from oil and gas, pharmaceutical, 
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banks and metallurgy industry. It can be explained by the fact that oil and gas and metallurgy 
industries are strategically important for the country, therefore, they were the first among Russian 
companies that have begun the process of internationalization. Nevertheless, as was mentioned 
above, the research is based only on 101 observations because unavailability of information about 
companies’ foreign sales. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that these conclusions are not definite 
and perhaps not very representative. 
As for amount of total sales and intangible assets, the large amount of these financial 
indicators belongs to companies from oil and gas, metallurgy and banks industries. This fact can 
correlate with the level of internationalization. Firms that actively operate in international markets 
usually have larger sales than domestic companies. Moreover, one of he most common strategies 
of entering into new market is purchasing of assets. Companies that operate in the foreign markets 
and buy assets have intangible assets in their balance sheets.  
Descriptive statistics also depicts that companies that do not actively internationalize and 
even do not well-known in the domestic markets do not have intangible assets in their balance 
sheets. In addition, companies with low level of political connections usually do not have or have 
smaller amount of intangible assets that can be explained by the fact that intangible value of the 
firm is also formed by its officials (members of board of directors and top management team). 
Regarding to administrative expenses that show the amount of money that a company 
spends not directly tied to a specific function or generally speaking, on operations. Administrative 
expenses also include expenses that the firm spends on board of directors and top management 
team. Descriptive statistics shows that companies with larger amount of board members have 
higher administrative expenses than other firms whose board of directors included few people. In 
addition, high administrative expenses have companies from oil and gas and metallurgy industries; 
companies from these industries also usually have quite large in size board of directors. 
As for return on assets (ROA) that represents how efficiently management of the company 
uses its assets in order to generate earning, descriptive statistics does not show any visible 
regularities. 
The industries that are characterized by high amount of government ownership are banks 
and transportation. The companies from oil and gas industry have much high amount of politicians 
in the board of directors in comparison with other companies despite the fact that they almost do 
not have government share. The same situation can be observed from the example of metallurgy 
industries that also characterized by high level of politicians among board members. Moreover, 
companies from oil and gas and metallurgy industries have the highest level of political 
connections – almost all of them have among board members or top management team people who 
have held top positions in the central government or have close connections with former or present 
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Russian presidents and prime minsters. These observations lead to the conclusion that the 
government in order to control strategically important industries instead of using direct 
mechanisms of influence such as share in the companies, tend to choose indirect mechanisms that 
help to impact on the companies through people closed to the government.  
It was also found that the companies that have a large amount of government contracts are 
firms that belong to machinery and construction industries. This fact can be explained by the 
important role that military has in Russia. Most of these companies produce different military 
equipment. In addition, some of these companies relate to space industry that also represents high 
interest for Russian government. From these observations the following conclusion can be made: 
industries that represent the high strategic interest for the state and influences state image are under 
a greater state control. This results correlate with official policy of Russian government that has 
repeatedly stressed that the main priority of the foreign policy of the country is to ensure national 
safety. 
3.2 Hypotheses testing 
Multicollinearity 
Correlation coefficients presented in the Table 6 show that the majority of variables are scarcely 
correlated with others, without multicollinearity issues and without exceedingly large coefficients that 
can show that some variables are excessive and duplicate the existing ones. 
 
 Table 7. Correlation 
 Correlations 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
№ of 
count. 
Board 
size 
Gov. 
contr. 
Politicians 
on the 
board  
Level of 
political 
conn. 
Gov. 
own. FSTS 
Firm 
size 
Total 
sales 
Intang
. assets 
Adm. 
Exp. ROA 
№ of count. 1,000            
Board size ,197 1,000           
Gov. contr. ,017 ,135 1,000          
Politicians on 
the board  
,304 ,662 ,222 1,000         
Level of 
political conn. 
,252 ,619 ,089 ,788 1,000        
Gov. own. ,120 ,265 ,224 ,447 ,379 1,000       
FSTS ,139 ,285 ,490 ,245 ,219 ,306 1,000      
Firm size ,049 ,436 ,305 ,298 ,367 ,140 ,254 1,000     
Total sales ,320 ,165 ,177 ,276 ,142 ,129 ,392 ,490 1,000    
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Intangible 
assets 
,285 ,371 ,359 ,138 ,382 ,190 ,240 ,390 ,538 1,000   
Adm. Exp. ,490 ,082 ,463 ,275 ,284 ,144 ,308 ,250 ,159 ,204 1,000  
ROA ,282 ,337 ,216 ,341 ,613 ,402 ,503 ,232 ,307 ,119 ,351 1,000 
Source: author 
 
T-test 
T-test was conducted in order to understand how the means of dependent variables FSTS and 
Number of Countries differ with the government involvement measured by the following variables: size 
of the board of directors, government contracts, political connectedness and government ownership. 
After analyzing the results of t-test it was found that there are significant differences among means 
of Number of countries variable and all independent variables, except for government ownership. Also 
it was found that the FDI decreases with increasing level of political connectedness, which means that 
hypothesis 4 is rejected. 
As it can be seen from the results, higher means of the Number of Countries are displayed for the 
companies that have: 
• politicians among members of the board of directors and top management  
• government contracts  
• political connections. 
However, the hypothesis 2 which states that government ownership positively influences 
internationalization is rejected, since no significant difference was found between the means of the 
quantity of countries which have government ownership and which do not.  
Table 8. Results of T-tests. Differences in Number of Countries means between companies 
with political connections and without them 
Group Observation Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
State Ownership 
0 115 9,3201 0,9323 8,3240 6,8912 11,0612 
1 42 16,322 3,2303 15,8720 9,0330 20,3220 
combined 157 12,025 0,9999 11,2232 7,2626 12,9300 
diff  -6,8235 3,0512  -8,6320 -1,9292 
diff = mean (0) – mean (1)                                                                      t= -2, 6031 
Ho: diff = 0    degrees of 
freedom= 159 
Ha: diff<0  Ha: diff!=0  Ha: diff>0  
Pr(T<t)= 0, 0021 Pr(T>t)= 0,0049 Pr(T>t)= 0,8869 
Politicians on board of directors 
0 49 5,6120 0,6569 6,5589 6,1123 9,1121 
1 108 11,7687 1,6292 13,8635 8,5053 16,6250 
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combined 157 9,0205 0,8319 12,0320 7,2321 11,6300 
diff  -6,8321 1,8329  -8,5324 -3,2051 
diff = mean (0) – mean (1)                                                                      t= -3,1139 
Ho: diff = 0    degrees of 
freedom = 159 
Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff!=0  Ha: diff>0  
Pr(T<t) =  0,0006 Pr(T>t)= 0,0019 Pr(T>t)= 0,8772 
Political connections 
0 42 4,9980 0,6432 6,2332 5,93676 8,0321 
1 115 13,8213 1,969 16,7321 12,2321 19,3231 
combined 157 9,0202 0,94329 13,1312 8,1623 12,9300 
diff  -7,8739 1,8369  -12,5467 -5,6125 
diff = mean (0) – mean (1)                                                              t=-4,2992 
Ho: diff = 0    degrees of 
freedom = 159 
Ha: diff<0  Ha: diff!=0  Ha: diff>0  
Pr(T<t) = 0,0000 Pr(T>t)= 0,0000 Pr(T>t)= 0,9000 
Government contracts 
0 90 9,3213 0,9328 11,1235 4,3251 12,1202 
1 67 9,9231 11,123 9,1025 8,3123 13,1325 
combined 157 9,0220 9,0205 13,1563 8,1356 10,9330 
diff  -1,8853 1,8655  -4,9934 -2,3041 
diff = mean (0) – mean (1)                                                                t=-4,5421 
Ho: diff = 0    degrees of 
freedom = 159 
Ha: diff<0  Ha: diff!=0  Ha: diff>0  
Pr(T<t) = 0,0021 Pr(T>t)= 0,0328 Pr(T>t)= 0,0152 
Source: author 
 
With regards to the testing of dependent variable FSTS, T-test conducted with this dependent 
variable did not show any significant results. This can be possibly explained by the lack of available 
data on foreign sales of the companies. 
 
OLS Regression model 
In order to understand how independent variables measuring government involvement influence 
the level of internationalization of companies, regression models were used. The dependent variable in 
the first model is the number of countries in which firms have affiliates, with the following control 
variables, which are the size of the firm, administrative expenses, intangible assets and total sales. 
Independent variables are state ownership, number of politicians on the board of directors, level of 
political connectedness of the members of the board and the presence of the government contracts.  
The model summary, presented in the Appendix 1 shows that overall the model is significant. 
However, we may infer from the model summary below, that influence of control variables on the model 
is negligible.  
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As for individual contribution of independent variables, it can be inferred that not all variables are 
significant to internationalization process. By looking at the results of regression analysis, it can be 
inferred that the number of politicians on the board of directors is the most important factor in explaining 
internationalization to other countries, followed by government contracts and level of political 
connections. Among the least influential factors is governmental ownership. Based on the obtained 
results, it can be concluded that the quantity of politicians on the board of directors is more important 
than the perceived influence of the individual politically-affiliated members. 
In order to test other hypotheses hierarchical OLS regression was conducted. The results of the 
analysis are presented in the Table 7. As can be seen from the table, model 1 includes all variables and 
other models consist of only statistically important variables. As expected, not all variables are 
significant for measuring internationalization process. Nevertheless, the OLS regression model helps to 
indicate that the number of former and present politicians among board of directors and level of political 
connections have positive correlation with internationalization of Russian firms.  
Thus, hypothesis 1 («number of former and present politicians among top officials of the company 
are positively influence the internationalization») and hypothesis 5 («high level of political 
connectedness of board members and CEOs positively influence internationalization») were proved. 
These results correspond to the result of the recent empirical research related to the topic of influence of 
political connections and government involvement on internationalization process in other emerging 
countries. 
The hypothesis 2 («government ownership positively influences internationalization») was 
rejected, the correlation between government shares and FSTS of the companies was not found. It can 
be explained by the fact that nowadays the government tend to impact on domestic companies not 
through direct mechanism (ownership) but through various indirect mechanisms. For instance, as was 
mentioned above, the state controls firms using people resource. People closed to the government belong 
to companies’ members of board of directors or top management team. This strategy works more 
effective than traditional direct mechanisms (Boubakri, Cosset, Saffar, 2012).  
 
Table 9. Result of regression analysis: Number of countries model 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Observations 157 157 157 
R sq. 0,4634 0,4532 0,4498 
Adj. R sq. 0, 4223 0,4270 0,4330 
F statistics 7,2 (0,000) 12,45 (0,000) 34,38 (0,000) 
    
Size 11,07 (0,000) 12,23 (0,000) 12,56 (0,000) 
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Administrative 
expenses 
5,21 (0,036) 5,30 (0,032) 5,36 (0,025) 
Intangible assets 0,89 (0,230)   
Total sales 0,45 (0,5910)   
    
Oil and Gas 0,10 (0,89107)   
Banks -0,19 (0,8789)   
Construction -0,35 (0,5689)   
Transportation 0,26 (0,9032)   
Wholesale 0,09 (0,8220)   
Pharmaceutical  0,25 (0,9400)   
Metallurgy 4,99 (0,3120)   
Retail 5,16 (0,0310) 6,34 (0,023) 6,40 (0,020) 
IT -0,79  (0,3710)   
Government 
ownership 
-0,61 (0,712) -0,59 (0,718)  
Politicians among 
members of board of 
directors 
 
4,29 (0,002) 
 
4,56 (0,000) 
 
4,39 (0,0001) 
Level of political 
connections 
3,12 (0,045) 2,19 (0,038) 2,39 (0,018) 
Government contracts 5,41 (0,003) -7, 61 (0,000)  
Source: author 
 
Finally, the main results of the analysis are represented in the table 8. The analysis proved 
the fact that the government involvement and political affiliation play an extremely important role. 
This study showed that political connections among companies’ members of board of directors 
and top management and the level of these connections todays represent the powerful mechanism 
through which the government controls firms’ activities or even has the impact on them. 
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Table 10. Results 
Hypotheses Proved/rejected 
Hypothesis 1. Number of former and present politicians 
among top officials of the company positively influences 
internationalization. 
 
Confirmed 
Hypothesis 2. Government ownership positively 
influences internationalization. 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 3. Government contracts positively 
influence internationalization. 
Confirmed 
Hypothesis 4. High level of political connectedness 
more positively relates to foreign direct investments  
rather than export 
 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 5. High level of political connectedness of 
board members and CEOs positively influence 
internationalization. 
 
Confirmed 
Source: developed by author 
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CHAPTER 4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Summary 
This study investigates different forms and directions of government involvement in 
internationalization process of Russian firms. The research was conducted gradually. First of all 
the research goals, objectives and questions were formulated. After this, the analysis of literature 
related to this topic was conducted. It helped to understand the topic of the role of government in 
internationalization process of Russian firms in detail, consider previous empirical researches 
dedicated to this theme, create the list of variables and finally, develop the hypotheses. After the 
data collection process the statistical analysis was conducted. The analysis fulfilled the goals and 
helped to investigate such forms of government involvement as number of people with political 
background or closed to the state among companies’ official, level of these connections and  
provision of government contracts highly impact the internationalization process of Russian 
companies. 
4.2 Implications for theory and practice 
This master thesis contributes to the business literature by complementing the resource-
based theory that states that political resource factor is an important tool that can become a strong 
competitive advantage for the companies. The findings of the current study demonstrate how 
political background of members of board of directors and top management team can become a 
powerful resources that facilitates companies’ activities and particularly the internationalization 
process. 
In addition, the results have important practical managerial implication. Firstly, the 
shareholders during the process of formation of board of directors should take into account the 
importance of political background of board members that can bring a lot of bonuses for the 
company; for instance, facilitate internationalization process. Moreover, top managers that work 
in the companies from developing countries should take into consideration that in addition to 
achievement of corporate and economic goals political connections of company’s officials are also 
able to facilitate the internationalization. 
4.3 Suggestions for the furture research 
The present study considers such ways of government involvement in internationalization 
process of domestic firms as provision of government contacts, state ownership and political 
connections of officials of the companies – member of board of directors and top management 
team. However, other ways of state influence on domestic firms exist; among them are provision 
of government credits and loans and access to strategically important resources; decrease of taxes; 
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granting benefits during IPO; provision of lobbying regulatory policies adopted by the 
government; government bailout.  
Another interesting mechanism is related to the foreign policy of the state. The government 
interested in international expansion of particular companies can negotiate with foreign countries 
where these companies plan to operate and sign special documents and agreements facilitated the 
enter into new market or operations there. It is especially important for companies from developing 
economies because in many cases they do not have enough resources and capabilities to enter new 
markets and need support from the domestic government. This direction of government role in 
internationalization process can also significantly contribute to the existence pool of knowledge 
dedicated to the topic of government impact on internationalization of domestic firms. 
As can be seen from these enumeration, there are a lot of different variables that can also 
have an impact on internationalization process of companies and impact them in different 
directions. For these reason further researches may focus on these variables, investigate their 
correlation with internationalization process of Russian  and other multinational firms from 
countries with emerging economies  and create a developed framework that can fully explain all 
forms and directions of state involvement in international activities of companies.   
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CONCLUSION 
The main goal of this research was to develop the understanding of the government role in 
internationalization process of Russian multinational enterprises. The statistical analysis helped to 
achieve this goals and showed that political connections and government involvement are one of 
main forces that impacts internationalization process of MNEs in Russia. This fact is undeniable, 
however, it is necessary to pay attention to the specific mechanisms by which the state has an 
impact on domestic firms. The analysis has shown that not all mechanisms of state involvement 
are effective measures of influence on the process of internationalization. 
The statistical analysis helps to investigate that the number of politicians among members 
of board of directors and top management team is positively related to internationalization while 
government ownership does not have any effect on internationalization process. These 
investigations led to the conclusion that Russian government tends to use informal mechanisms of 
influence rather than direct. The state involves in the companies’ activities through less obvious 
ways such as people. For example,  companies from oil and gas industry are characterized by high 
internationalization level and have much high number of politicians among its officials in 
comparison with firms from other industries despite the fact that they almost do not have 
government share. 
In general, the results have shown that the more number of people that are former or present 
politicians, closed to the government or have personal contacts with officials the more company 
is internationalized.  
In addition, the statistical analysis revealed a positive relationship between amount of 
government contracts and internationalization. That also proved the suggestions that Russian 
government influences the internationalization process of domestics firms and supports some of 
them through provision of government contracts and other bonuses.  
Regarding to FDI internationalization strategy, the regression analysis showed that 
political connections do not influence FDI. Thus, this hypothesis is considered not to be confirmed.  
To sum up, in this master thesis it was investigated that Russian companies as majority of 
firms from emerging countries highly depend on the domestic government that in turn, uses 
different types of mechanisms – formal and informal in order to impact companies activities and 
operations. Nowadays informal mechanisms in many cases are more effective and afford the state 
to be involved in different firms’ activities such as internationalization. 
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Appendix 1. Model summary 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 ,197a ,039 ,033 ,039 6,263 1 155 ,013 
2 ,309b ,095 ,065 ,056 2,355 4 151 ,056 
a. Predictors 
